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Preliminary
Philosopher Karl Popper formulated the philosophy of ‘critical rationalism’ in reac-
tion to the convention of devoting substantial space in philosophy texts to deﬁning 
terms, supposedly to obviate ambiguity, yet never succeeding. He concluded that 
elaborate attempts at linguistic precision added more words than clarity, and we 
should not invest too many intellectual resources in analysing and deﬁning terms. 
Accordingly, he at best encouraged relying on words and phrases with established 
and generally recognised meanings. Notwithstanding Popper’s profound insight, 
there is a need to deﬁne terms when considering devolution because of sloppy ways 
in which core words and phrases are used almost without exception in literature 
on devolution and related concepts such as federalism, confederalism, democracy, 
freedom and other checks and balances against the concentration and abuse of 
centralised political power. The lack of terminological clarity and consistency makes 
it very difﬁcult to communicate theories in the Popperian sense. The uncommon 
degree of confusion surrounding these concepts is reﬂected in the extent to which 
there has been misdirected research resulting in dubious conclusions. There are, for 
instance, studies purporting to show conclusively that devolution coincides with 
more and less prosperity, peace and freedom respectively.
The original title of this paper was Decentralisation as a Guarantor of Peace. 
When I communicated with a constitutional law scholar about it, he’d understood 
‘decentralisation’ in the town and regional planning, and industrial policy sense, 
instead of what jurists and political scientists more commonly call ‘devolution’. Swit-
ching to ‘devolution’ reduces the risk of miscommunication only slightly because 
devolution has diverse meanings, two of which need to be distinguished unam-
biguously: entrenched devolution of legislative power (the subject of this paper) 
as opposed to ad hoc decentralisation or delegation of administrative functions. 
Devolution has many forms and goes by various names such as ‘grass roots demo-
cracy’, ‘regionalism’, ‘provincialism’ ‘federalism’ and ‘confederalism’. 
‘Federalism’ and ‘confederalism’ tend to be used loosely, even as synonyms. 
Opinions on the difference, if any, between ‘federal‘ and ‘confederal’ vary substan-
tially. A common assumption is that ‘confederations’ are more extreme forms of 
federalism (that is, with more devolution). Another view is that confederations are 
alliances between sovereign states. This paper follows the convention of regarding 
countries as confederations if federal units have the right of secession (regardless of 
the degree of devolution). De facto is distinguished from de jure devolution, which 
constitutes ‘federation’. De facto is generally as desirable as de jure devolution, al-
beit more vulnerable to subversion by virtue of the natural propensity of people in 
power to want and seize more of it unless constitutionally constrained. 
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There has been no attempt of which I am aware either to rank federations ac-
cording to how ‘federal’ they are (how much power is devolved), or to distinguish 
between de facto and de jure devolution, that is, whether devolution is constitu-
tionalised. This lacuna makes it almost impossible to establish the signiﬁcance of 
devolution empirically. Even so, there are studies that purport to do so. 
The discourse on devolution tends to occur as if devolution is a stand-alone 
concept rather than one of the checks and balances against the abuse and over-
concentration of power. It should be considered alongside such checks and balan-
ces as the rule of law, due process, referenda and elections. This paper argues that 
the prospects of peace are enhanced and the risk of inter-group and geographic 
conﬂict reduced to the extent that there are institutional mechanisms (checks and 
balances) to proscribe the power of some over others. In other words, where power 
constitutes a real or perceived threat to freedom, conﬂict is more likely. Conﬂict 
can often be ameliorated by increasing freedom at the expense of power. The single 
most effective way to limit power is to devolve it. This means neither that devo-
lution is a guarantor (in the literal sense) of peace, nor the only contributor to it. 
What devolution guarantees is that conﬂict is less likely, especially if devolution 
is accompanied by related checks and balances. 
This paper argues that freedom and power are juxtaposed by deﬁnition, and 
that devolution per se increases freedom to the extent that it usually means, as is 
illustrated below, that more people live according to their own wishes instead of the 
dictates of others. This fact is seldom recognised. Jurist Clint Bolick in Grassroots 
Tyranny: The Limits of Federalism (Reason, 1993) argues compellingly that there 
are substantial threats to liberty even with devolution, that second and third tier 
governments often curtail liberty excessively. However, he does not question the 
conﬂict-reducing nature of devolution.
Develution Deﬁned
There is much to be learnt from the popular and scholarly discourse on political 
institutions and their relationship with country performance regarding peace, 
prosperity and freedom. This paper is less concerned with what has already been 
addressed adequately than with lacunae and anomalies in contemporary literature 
with a view to promoting more rigorous use of terminology and reaching better 
conclusions about the contribution of political institutions such as devolution to 
the course of events. 
I have been a student of political institutions and systems since becoming in-
timately involved with South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy du-
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ring the mid-1980s1. Being a role-player in the realities of creating a constitution 
for a conﬂict-ridden country, forces one to get beyond rhetoric, clichés, platitudes 
and generalisations to a translation of abstract concepts into practical, concrete 
and unambiguous terms. My books, papers and submissions during South Africa’s 
transition and subsequently have been concerned primarily with clarifying con-
cepts and identifying which respective characteristics are associated with countries 
that succeed or fail at achieving peace, stability and prosperity. To the extent that 
these ideals might be achieved by institutions that curtail rather than enhance 
personal liberty, I have paid special attention to the relationship between them 
and liberty. 
Notwithstanding classical liberal assumptions to the contrary, the two do not 
necessarily coincide. Indeed, the evidence suggests to a distressing degree that less 
liberty may promote more stability and maybe also more peace and prosperity, at 
least in the short term, also depending on other variables.2 
The contribution of devolution to peace can be hypothesised a priori or estab-
lished, at least in principle, by comparing federations with non-federations. There 
are at least two recognised, but not entirely consistent lists of countries considered 
to be ‘federal’ (Appendix 1). Federalism is usually presumed to exist when powers 
are devolved constitutionally to second tier governments, normally called ‘provin-
ces’ or ‘states’. What I had hoped to do in this paper was to correlate the degree of 
devolution and federalism – they are not the same thing – with outcomes. Apart 
from the obvious challenge that there might not be enough examples for purely 
statistical analysis, I encountered a much bigger problem, which is the absence 
of an index ranking countries according to how federal they are. The organisatio-
nal structure of the federations listed in Appendix 1 is summarised in Appendix 2. 
What qualiﬁes for inclusion of lower tier government structures is that they are 
federal, namely that they have devolved powers to legislate. This is what is meant 
by the ‘devolution of power’. Decentralisation of non-legislative functions is of-
ten also called devolution, which is unfortunate because it blurs the often crucial 
distinction between the two concepts. And they are often used interchangeably 
with delegation which undermines the ability of the word to describe ‘passing 
down’ of a legislative or executive power or function, the difference being that 
1 Since core aspects of this paper are derived from personal experience it does not always observe 
customary de-personalisation.
2 This observation is notwithstanding the fact that I value liberty above other societal goals, 
a position that seems to me to be shared by very few people. There is an unwarranted and 
near-universal assumption by protagonists of philosophical models that all virtue happens to 
coincide with whatever they espouse. My objective in this paper is not to have my personal 
predispositions compromise my analysis. 
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the former two refer to the default locus of a power or function, and the latter to 
the discretionary reallocation thereof. To a casual reader, these distinctions may 
seem pedantic or trivial, but they can be of enormous importance, especially for 
conﬂict-reduction. 
South Africa’s apartheid experience is one of many that illustrates the point. 
Some ‘homelands’ were nominally independent and others had varying powers and 
functions devolved to them. However, the South Africa government never behaved 
as if there was more than ad hoc delegation. It established an elaborate ‘secretariat’ 
to control what each homeland did with its ‘independence’. It maintained control 
over homeland ﬁnances by convoluted mechanisms, and threatened to cut-off 
funding if any homeland stepped out of line. It sent its formidable army into two 
of them when there was real or threatened destabilisation. Since there was no real 
devolution let alone independence, I asked a South African government minister if 
his government believed in its own policies – and suggested that, if they did, they 
would want homelands to be genuinely independent countries, behaving like, for 
instance, the ‘BSL’ countries (Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho), which are what 
homelands would have become had they been truly independent. Whether genu-
ine independence or devolution could have legitimised the homeland component 
of apartheid is an interesting ‘what if’ mind game which is not of immediate re-
levance. The point is that that South Africa’s homeland experience was a virtual 
controlled experiment illustrating the differences between confederalism, federa-
lism, devolution, decentralisation and delegation, as well the importance of whe-
ther institutions are de jure or de facto. That the homeland policy not only failed 
to avoid conﬂict but probably exacerbated it, illustrates how importance it is for 
devolution to be more real than apparent, and more substantial than trivial. That 
post-apartheid South Africa has political stability and inter-group peace without 
much devolution, is probably attributable to the extent to which other checks and 
balances are in place. South Africa has, for instance, a Bill of Rights with strong 
protection of ﬁrst generation (classical liberal) rights, and has amongst the world’s 
highest scores on relevant indices such as the rule of law, independence of the ju-
diciary, civil liberties, impartial judges, enforcement of contracts and the like.
Some countries, like post-apartheid South Africa, are nominally federal in that 
there are constitutionally entrenched powers located at the second tier of govern-
ment called ‘provinces’. However, these powers are very limited and, more signiﬁ-
cantly, in practice, there is virtually no internal policy diversity for two reasons:3
3 Words like ‘devolution’, ‘delegation’ and ‘decentralisation’ imply passing down, and are not 
strictly speaking correct words for powers and functions that are not passed downwards by 
central authority. Most federations have powers delegated upwards from what become second 
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1. The ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC) is in power in all provinces 
and maintains centrally imposed party uniformity similar to what it inherited 
from its apartheid regime predecessor4.
2. There is a surviving legacy of apartheid homelands that consists of a national 
mindset or ethos according to which it is presumed that there should be nati-
onal uniformity, to which end there is an elaborate set of mechanisms, much 
like apartheid’s homeland ‘secretariat’, to prevent diversity ‘harmonisation’. 
The effect of this is that South Africa, like some other nominal federations, 
does not enjoy potential beneﬁts of internal diversity or the ‘demonstration effect’. 
Not only are there very few exclusive provincial powers, but the government has 
decided for undisclosed reasons to replicate government functions at all levels, so 
that there are, for instance, housing departments for national, provincial and local 
government, with predictable confusion and needless cost. Consumer affairs struc-
tures are duplicated nationally and provincially. National and local government po-
lice forces have overlapping responsibilities, which, in turn, overlap with dedicated 
trafﬁc departments. Thus the country, like so many others, incurs the full cost of 
duplication and harmonisation without enjoying detectable beneﬁts. 
Like other pseudo-federations, South Africa has needlessly big government, 
occasioned by the addition of harmonising structures and processes, instead of 
having less government at national level which would have been the case had 
‘concurrent’ powers and functions been devolved. For devolution to achieve one 
of its most signiﬁcant virtues, getting more done with cheaper and less govern-
ment, and reﬂecting regional diversity, there must be de facto devolution. One of 
the lessons I have learnt from the South African experience, and observing that 
of other federations, such as Germany and the USA, is that de facto devolution is 
more important than de jure devolution, not just for better government, but also 
for peace, to which I return below. 
Another complication as far as understanding the substance of devolution or 
federalism is concerned is that some countries have constitutionally delegated po-
wers and functions, including exclusive powers and functions, to third tier ‘local’ 
 tier governments. A better term for describing the locus of powers and functions (where they 
reside) by virtue of a treaty or constitution may be ‘located’ or ‘allocated’.
4 The South African government does participates in internation meetings of federal countries, 
which suggests that it regards the country as being a true federeation. Senior member of the 
ruling party occasionally suggest that there should be more devolution, and occasionally the 
opposite, the abolition af provincial legislatures. The Constitutional Court has upheld consti-
tutional federalism by declaring liquor licensing to be an exclusive provincial competence and 
attempts by central government to regulate liquor licensing tobe unconsstitutional.
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governments known by many names such as ‘villages’, ‘towns’ ‘communes’, ‘com-
munities’, ‘cities’, ‘boroughs’ and the like. 
Although devolution to local government is not normally regarded as a form 
of ‘federalism’, some countries, such as Sweden, have more local autonomy and 
diversity than the intermediate regions in many federal states. USA and Swiss local 
governments (especially bigger ‘cities’) often have degrees of autonomy exceeding 
that of federal states in some countries. Cities often have further devolution5 to 
a fourth tier. The fourth level of government has a multiplicity of names inter-
nationally. In Johannesburg, for instance, there are fourth tier ‘regions’ in some 
big cities, and within these there are ﬁfth tier sub-regions called ‘suburbs’. Some 
cities, like Toronto, are highly centralised ‘unicities’ or ‘megacities’, whilst others, 
like Berlin (until recently) are (or were) decentralised with various ‘councils’ and 
‘mayors’ in a single metropolitan city. In some countries, such as the UK, there are 
cities formally linked to ‘satellite’ cities around them, and there are others with 
‘metropolitan’ super-structures such as the Greater London Council.
In short, what is to be regarded as devolved or federal is a complex and deba-
table matter. Such lists of ‘federal’ countries as have been compiled are not only 
inconsistent6, but inclusion appears to be exclusively what appears on constitutional 
paper, not what happens in practice. Until there are recognised criteria for deciding 
which countries are devolved, empirical analysis remains difﬁcult and dubious. 
De Facto and de jure Devolution
That is not the end of it. For obvious reasons domestic and international conﬂict is 
more likely when there is real world interference with the autonomy of regions by 
national governments or countries by other countries, regardless of nominal legal 
arrangements (to which we return below). There are countries that are nominally 
‘unitary’ states such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, which have a greater de-
gree of de facto internal diversity and devolution than many nominal federations. Is 
federalism a purely de jure phenomenon, or should de facto devolution be regarded 
as federalism, especially since the latter often entails more devolution? 
As if that were not confusing enough to render empirical analysis almost im-
possible, it should be remembered that many former communist countries were 
5 Words like ‘devolution’, ‘delegation’ and ‘decentralisation’ imply passing down, and are not 
strictly speaking correct words for powers and functions that are not passed downwards by 
central authority. Most federations have powers delegated upards what become second tier 
governments A better term for describing the locus of powers and functions (where they reside) 
by virtue of a treaty or constitution may be ‘located’ or ‘allocated’.
6 Appendix 1. 
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nominally federations, though they were seldom regarded as such by Western 
scholars and therefore not included in lists of federations. This was because of the 
assumption that they were de facto internally uniform ‘unitary’ states subjected to 
‘central planning’. It turns out from post-communist access to information about 
Soviet era realities that there was much more devolution and diversity under com-
munism than notorious communist propaganda admitted, not just in communist 
federations, but also in non-federations, especially China, where there was and 
increasingly is a degree of internal regional and local diversity that is hard for peo-
ple in the West to comprehend. 
The recent ‘marketisation’ index of Chinese provinces reﬂects them as having 
a wider range of economic and jurisprudential systems than exists between all the 
world’s countries7. The degree of economic freedom in China’s economically freest 
province, Guangdong, is similar to that of the world’s freest economy, Hong Kong, 
and its economically least free province, Qinghai, is less free than the world’s least 
free economies, Myanmar and Zimbabwe. Most of China’s economic growth and 
development occurs in its Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which probably have the 
freest economies on earth by a signiﬁcant margin. Yet China is not included in lists 
of ‘federations’, and as far as I could establish, is universally regarded as a non-
federal ‘unitary’ state. This is apparently because it was and, to some extent still 
is, classiﬁed as a communist country. Were federalists to regard it as federal, they 
could claim it as another example of a country that maintained relative peace and 
stability despite substantial internal diversity and a history, like Switzerland’s, of 
internal and international conﬂict, including the extreme oppression of the Cultu-
ral Revolution and the Great Leap Forward. 
Similar recent attempts at classifying the economic systems of India’s states 
suggest that it too has a greater degree of internal diversity than most western 
federations, despite having been nominally subjected to socialist central planning 
and uniformity for many decades. Such comparisons have been made possible by 
contemporary attempts at ranking second tier government systems. Two of the 
western democratic federations that have been classiﬁed are Canada and America, 
where differences are smaller than regional differences in China8. 
7 Chinese provinces have been ranked (www.cerdi.org/colloque/IDREC2001/Fangang.pdf) along 
lines similar to the Economic Freedom of the World Index (www.freetheworld.com). Comparable 
indices include the Economic Freedom Index (www.heritage.org/index), the Country Risk Guide 
(http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/icrg.html), the Global Competitiveness Index (http://www.wefo-
rum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm), and the Freedom 
in the World Index (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2006).
8 Recent classiﬁcations include the USA, Canada and Arab states (www.freetheworld.com). 
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In the circumstances, there is a serious political science lacuna regarding what 
can reasonably be called federalism and, more signiﬁcantly, how to rank federati-
ons. Until this lacuna has been ﬁlled, the best that can be done is to rely on trite 
knowledge and intuition, which is notoriously subjective and fallible.
Standard literature also distinguishes between ‘federalism’ and ‘confederalism’, 
the idea being, as has been mentioned, that confederalism exists where there is 
a looser federation, especially one where federal states have, at least in theory, 
a right of secession. The Soviet Union (USSR) was a confederation to the extent 
that some of its states had the constitutional right to secede, a right which was 
used with alacrity when the Soviet Union collapsed. The Soviet (con-) federation 
was a two-tier federation in that the Russian federation was a federation within 
a federation. Much confusion and conﬂict resulted from de facto and de jure dis-
tinctions between federal components with and without exit rights. The de jure 
versus de facto issue is important because de jure federalism and confederalism 
can be more apparent than real. The American civil war is mistakenly recorded 
by history as a war about slavery whereas the issue, at least in a technical sense, 
was whether the ‘southern states’ had the right to secede. On paper, they did; in 
practice they did not. 
The European Union (EU) is in the reverse situation, where there is no formal 
right of exit for member states9, yet no one expects big Germany (82 m) and Fran-
ce (63 m), or small Malta (0.4 m) and Luxembourg (0.46 m) to be invaded if they 
leave the EU. Does this make the EU a ‘union’, ‘federation’, ‘confederation’, ‘unitary 
state’ or something else, or nothing more than an association of sovereign states 
with the EU parliament amounting to a co-ordinating international agency like 
the UN for limited purposes? 
Daniel Elazar resolves the matter thus: „If it quacks like a duck, walks like a 
duck, and looks like a duck, it is a duck, no matter what you call it.“10 He seems to 
be right that the EU is a federation rather than a confederation because there is 
no right of secession. The de facto right – using the duck analogy – makes the EU 
a de facto confederation. As with other confederations, over time the de facto po-
sition may eventually coincide with the law, and the EU may become, by standard 
deﬁnition, a federation. This is, at least, what German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, 
currently heading the German presidency of the EU envisages.11
9 Such a formal right of exit has been included in the new proposal for a Constitutional Treaty 
of the EU (Art. I-60). Tthis treaty, however, has not been ratiﬁed yet.
10 Daniel J. Elazar, Federalism and Peace-making.
11 The Economist, The World in 2007, p50.
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The Soviet Union (USSR) was a de jure confederation in which there was no 
de facto right of secession until the collapse of the soviet empire. As soon as the 
likelihood of invasion for seceding states ended, many left the soviet confederation. 
That left the subsidiary ‘Russian Federation’, itself a member of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), consisting of 11 former Soviet Republics. The Russian 
Federation is itself a constitutionally complex matter with 88 ‘federal subjects’, 
comprising autonomous and semi-autonomous ‘republics’, ‘provinces’, ‘territories, 
‘autonomous districts’, ‘federal cities’ (Moscow and St Petersburg) and ‘federal 
districts’ (Appendix 3).
Degrees of Devolution, Diversity and Federalism
The preceding analysis suggests that the question as to which of the world’s countries 
have devolution, and which have federalism or confederalism, may have one, two or 
three answers depending on whether ‘devolution’ is institutionalised and how much 
of it there is. The relevance of all this is that, in the absence of clarity on what arran- 
gements, from the EU to Iraq, are regarded as true federations, it is difﬁcult if not im- 
possible to make empirical comparisons between federations and unitary states. 
Not only must there be a plausible working deﬁnition of federalism, but there 
would also have to be other considerations before the propensity of federalism to 
ameliorate conﬂict can be assessed empirically, such as some idea of relative pro-
pensities for conﬂict. It there is no real risk of inter-regional conﬂict in the USA or 
South Africa as there is in, say, Belgium, Switzerland and India, internal peace in 
the USA cannot be regarded as one of the beneﬁts of its federalism, but the im-
maculate conversion from conﬂict and instability to enduring peace, stability and 
prosperity in Switzerland certainly can be ascribed to the creation of the Swiss 
‘confederation’. 
Most countries are simply too small to be federations. A small homogeneous 
country like Malta does not ‘need’ devolution or federalism for internal conﬂict-
reducing purposes (thought it might beneﬁt economically and socially from devo-
lution). In the absence of countries being ranked according to (a) how federal they 
are and (b) what their propensity for internal conﬂict is, we are conﬁned to a priori 
analysis, casual (intuitive) observation and anecdotal evidence, which is what cha-
racterises extant literature. I had hoped to rank countries according to criteria (a) 
and (b) provisionally for this paper, but soon realised that a tentative list requires 
a more elaborate analysis than I could do with limited time and resources.
The consensus amongst students of federalism and the evidence they advance 
is compelling to the effect that there is more peace in internally divided countries, 
especially ones with large populations, when they are devolved. 
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The lack of an unambiguous list of federations, or clarity on what distinguishes 
federations from alternatives, and the lack of an index ranking countries by degree 
of federalism, is instructive in that it indicates not just the degree to which ana-
lysts have relied on intuitive assumptions and popular axioms – some of which are, 
as I have tried to show, profoundly mistaken, but that there has been no serious 
scholarly discourse on the matter. Constitution drafters continue writing national 
constitutions without having reliable data on the world’s experience. This might be 
considered intellectually shameful, but for the fact that other indices we take for 
granted are themselves much more recent than is generally recognised. Analysts 
have become so accustomed to countries being classiﬁed and ranked according to 
their political and economic systems, and other criteria, that it is easily forgotten 
that these classiﬁcations have been produced for only about a decade. 
It is clear from this analysis of the concepts involved, that there is an insti-
tutional matrix with de facto and de jure on one axis and federalism, devoluti-
on, decentralisation and diversity on the other. Typically, even scholars blur these 
distinctions. Even in this paper these concepts could not always be distinguished 
rigorously.
 A. De jure B. De facto
1. Federalism 1A. The constitution  1B. Power is allocated as in 
 allocates exclusive powers,  1A, but by central  
 especially to second tier  government dicretion. 
 governments.
2. Devolution 2A. Power is passed down  2B. Power is passed down  
 by law to lower tiers of  as in 2A, but by discretion 
 government (regions,  (from any higher to any  
 districts, local governments, lower tier). 
 communities, etc).
3. Decentralisation 3A. Government affairs are 3B. Discretionary decen- 
 run by central government  tralisation. 
 through legally constituted 
 decentralised structures.
4. Diversity 4A. Cultural, economic,  4B. Diversity is  
 social, legal and other forms accommodated as a matter  
 of diversity are provided for of administrative practise. 
 in central government laws.
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In an insightful paper on Federalism – Some Lessons from a German Debate 
(2002), Gerhart Raichle of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation’s Liberales Institut 
suggests seven ‘aspects’ of federalism. They are:
1. Subsidiarity. The idea is that decisions should at higher levels of government 
only where they cannot feasibly be made at lower levels, or by individuals pri-
vately. Raichle regards this as ‘so universal that it can be safely said that every 
liberal solution of a problem contains an element of subsidiarity, ie an element 
of giving people more power over their own destiny’ (his emphasis).
2. Diversity. He suggests that ‘a federalist dispensation will facilitate taking 
account of regional peculiarities’. The most obvious conﬂict-reducing capacity 
of devolution is the accommodation of plural societies where local differences 
in culture, race, language, religion and the like would be conﬂict-provoking 
under conditions of centralisation or uniformity, but, he points out, devolution 
accommodates all forms of diversity.
3. Discovery. Devolution allows for competition between policies, which is, for 
reasons described by Friedrich Hayek, the best if not only way of ‘discovering’ 
which ideas are superior (see ‘demonstration effect’ below under Devolution 
and Prosperity).
4. Distribution of Power. Devolution is one of the most effective ‘checks and 
balances … required to effectively control power’. Devolution is the ‘vertical 
separation of power’ and virtuous for the same reasons that horizontal sepa-
ration widely regarded as an important constraint against excessive power.
5. Responsibility. With localised power, voters get credit for successful decisions, 
but also carry responsibility for sub-optimal decisions. Expeditious error-cor-
rection is more likely when the locus of power is closer to the people effected 
by it.
6. Taxation. Raichle argues that devolved power without ﬁscal ‘congruence’ 
is a ‘sham’. Fiscal federalism, as the concept is known, is a complex issue of 
immediate relevance primarily to the extent that the more the power to tax 
is centralised, the more likely it is that there will be redistribution to areas 
national politicians prefer from those they don’t, which is conﬂict-provoking. 
Nigeria is an example of the problem in that there has been endless conﬂict 
about the fact that most central government revenue is taken from the oil-rich 
Delta states . 
7. Supranational confederation. The EU is the best-known and the African 
Union the latest example of sovereign countries passing power ‘upwards’ to 
new supranational institutions. Raichle is concerned about the potential for 
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abuse when power but does not go so far as to regard the process as inherently 
illiberal in that centralisation is the opposite of devolution which he regards 
a inherently liberal. As explained elsewhere in this paper, centralisation is the 
process whereby most liberal federations and quasi-federations were establis-
hed. Political history is more commonly a history of smaller units joining into 
bigger ones, with devolution being the most effective way of retaining a degree 
of the earlier autonomy. 
Raichle epitomises the liberal predilection for federalism, where its principal 
virtue is its contribution to liberty. Its propensity to advance other virtues, such as 
prosperity, cultural integrity and diversity, and, of course, to ameliorate conﬂict, 
may be more signiﬁcant. It means that liberals can ‘sell’ liberalism (devolution) to 
non-liberals because of its ability to serve ends which liberals share but are not 
innately liberal. The Friedrich Naumann Foundation has been involved with the 
promotion of federalism in Pakistan, and a federal constitution for Iraq is seen by 
many as its only potentially peaceful option. In these cases peace is the principal 
issue. Economic considerations were paramount in the establishment of the EU 
and AU, and security was the stimulus for the Swiss confederation. The fact is that 
devolution has multiple beneﬁts and it is important to demonstrate and explain 
each if devolution is to be maintained where it exists, the be properly conceived 
where it is being introduced, and promoted where it is needed.
Devolution and Freedom
Freedom House (FH) has been ranking countries according to how much ‘freedom’ 
they enjoy since 1973. Yet, as far as I could establish, FH does not included federa-
lism per se as being freedom-enhancing. It is, perhaps, easy to understand why. FH 
would be under severe attack by unitary states, especially small ones, were they 
penalised for not being federal, yet regarding non-federations as inherently less 
free in at least some signiﬁcant senses is entirely justiﬁed. That federal devolution 
entails more freedom is clear from a great deal of discourse on federalism. 
Already in 1944 the great Austrian economist-philosopher, Ludwig von Mises, 
observed and explained the tendency for federalism and thus freedom to be eroded 
by virtue of the natural propensity of governments to extend powers and functions 
to the limits allowed by their constituencies.12 Even so, most commentators do not 
equate federalism per se with freedom. Where the issue is addressed explicitly, the 
12 Omnipotent Government: the Rise of the Total Sate and Total War, New Haven (1944), Arlington 
(1969), and Libertarian Press (1985). 
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tendency is to dismiss classifying countries according to whether they are federal 
as pointless on the grounds that federalism supposedly ‘doesn‘t concern itself with 
such things as civil rights. England, France and the United States are scattered into 
different categories despite the fact that they generally treat their citizens alike. 
The Netherlands and Sweden are lumped in with Saudi Arabia and Iran despite the 
enormous difference in how much power the monarch wields.’13 Protagonists of this 
misconception reveal less about federalism than about their failure to grasp the 
essence of federalism.
This paper argues that devolution not only promotes peace (which is the con-
sensus of federalist literature), but that it does so primarily because (a) there is 
more freedom per se with devolution, and (b) freedom is the central variable that 
reduces conﬂict. Just as we have countries classiﬁed and ranked politically (Freedom 
House), economically (World Economic Forum, Country Risk Guide, Heritage-WSJ, 
Fraser-Economic Freedom Network), and in many other senses such as corruption 
(Transparency International), there is a need for a ‘Devolution Index’. Pending such 
an index, we remain conﬁned to a priori analysis of the role of devolution as an 
institutional contributor to liberty, peace, stability and prosperity, and tentative 
empirical analysis. 
The theoretical case for regarding devolution as implying more freedom can 
be demonstrated by way of the diagrams shown below. The ﬁrst triangle depicts a 
centralised unitary state. It shows that, by deﬁnition at least (without regard for 
de facto devolution), there is a one-size-ﬁts-all and necessarily large government 
(relative to the functions of government) – a classic top-down regime. In it, the 
entire triangle is ﬁlled in order to accommodate the hierarchical system implicit 
in centralisation. 
13 This is a quotation from one of the recognised scholars in the ﬁeld, which got lost during editing 
and was not found  before going to press.
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The second triangle depicts what government would look like were there two 
countries instead of one. The blank area between the two lower triangles is not 
ﬁlled with hierarchical structures.
The third triangle depicts a devolved system where there is less government 
in the area between the smaller triangles than in a unitary state, and more than 
in separate countries. The principle can perhaps be better understood reductio ad 
absurdum. If there is devolution down to the individual there will be no govern-
ment at all. The bigger a county’s population, the bigger its government will have 
to be relatively, unless powers and functions are devolved.
The next diagram depicts the full range of hypothetical alternatives from zero 
government (left) to a single despot (right). That devolution is more democratic is 
illustrated in the diagrams above, and can be readily understood reductio ad ab-
surdum. If all power is devolved maximally (ie to individuals who have dominion 
over themselves), there is, by deﬁnition, zero power in the hands of government and 
100 % of how people are governed is decided („voted“) by themselves. Hypotheti-
cally full devolution is a ﬂat line where none are above others (as in the diagram). 
Dictatorship is a vertical line where there is one person at the top and all others 
fall beneath. Between the two is the real world, represented by triangles – ﬂatter 
and thus more democratic with more devolution.
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Devolution and Peace
According to one of the doyens of federalism, the late Daniel Elazar, ‘federalism has 
become an aid to peace-making, at least since the end of World War II’. Much of the 
literature on federalism presupposes that the principal purpose of federalism is to 
ameliorate the prospect of conﬂict in internally divided countries. The propensity 
of federalism to promote peace may be its most distinctive virtue, but there is more 
to it than that. The word has its origins in Latin words imputing trust, good faith, 
covenant, treaty and the like, speciﬁcally foedus meaning alliance or league (also 
covenant or treaty), ﬁdes meaning faith or trust, foederare meaning ‘to league to-
gether’, and its noun foederationem, in other words, federation. 
The term has been extended to describe a multiplicity of institutional arran-
gements, ranging from pseudo-autonomous geographic entities, like former com-
munist federations, to organs of civil society, such as trade union federations and 
the federal structure of political parties. It is not always clear what, if anything, 
all arrangements called federations have in common, including substantial diffe-
rences between federal governments, with which this paper is concerned. As far 
Why devolution is more democratic (1:2).
People have  
dominion over  
themselves –  
„an-archy“.
People are 
substantially free – 
„limited 
government“.
People are 
substantially 
unfree – 
„authoritarianism“.
One person has  
dominion over 
all other – 
„totatilarian 
dictatorship“.
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as countries are concerned, federations are more commonly independent states 
getting together, such as the USA, and occasionally consist of unitary states in 
which power is devolved, such as Ethiopia. 
That federations are more commonly independent states getting together sug-
gests that their peace-promoting propensity may often be secondary. Federations 
tend to be formed by entities at peace with each other, the most obvious contem-
porary example being the EU. Sometimes the impetus for federation is less to do 
with promoting internal peace and accommodating diversity than the formation of 
alliances for protection against external threats, of which Switzerland is the arche-
typal example. ‘Ethnic federations’ are a variant where the purpose of federalism 
may be inter-ethnic peace (Bosnia and Herzegovina) or merely the accommodation 
of ethnic diversity as a social end in itself (Russian Federation). 
South Africa is a curious hybrid, which may explain, in part, why it is not al-
ways regarded as a federation, not even by the political parties that negotiated 
its constitution. It is technically a federation in that the constitution allocates ex-
clusive and concurrent second and third tier powers. Delegated powers are so mi-
nimal and there is such de facto uniformity that some prominent politicians have 
suggested that the provincial legislatures should be abolished. The conspicuously 
ethnic nature of most provincial boundaries was never openly acknowledged du-
ring the constitution-making process. The point of immediate relevance is not just 
that it is an ethnic federation, but that there was no inter-ethnic conﬂict in need 
of federal accommodation, nor was there apparent appreciation of other beneﬁts 
of federalism. The South African experience points to the constant need for the 
case for federalism to be expounded. For federalism to fulﬁl its potential, the case 
for it must be appreciated. 
Another recent example of waning appreciation for the logic of federalism was 
America’s controversial presidential election, where there was widespread confusion 
about how President Bush could have won despite having less votes than rival, Al 
Gore. That federations allocate powers to federal units rather than numerical majo-
rities is a source of much confusion in the absence of effective public education.
Devolution is not just more conducive than centralisation to intra-state peace, 
but also more conducive to inter-state peace. Scott Silverstone concludes in Fe-
deral Democratic Peace: Domestic Institutions, International Conﬂict, and Ameri-
can Foreign Policy, 1807–1860 (2000) that the evidence supports the ‘logic of a 
theory of „federal democratic peace“. He examined ‘a series of international crises 
involving the United States between 1807 and 1860’ and found that in ‘eleven of 
the fourteen cases examined, the United States was constrained [by federalism] in 
 Devolution as a Guarantor of Peace 21
its use of force. In all eleven cases, the dynamics of American federalism provide a 
superior explanation to realist and liberal alternatives’. Silverstone ﬁnds that ‘fe-
deral asymmetry’ is ‘of enduring importance for questions of war and peace’ be-
cause ‘the clear concentration of pro-military, interventionist, unilateralist opinion 
in the American South and West’ are countermand by ‘the concentration of anti-
interventionist, multilateralist opinion in the Northeast, the northern Midwest, and 
in the Paciﬁc Northwest’ (http://www.isanet.org/archive/silverstone.html). Perhaps 
the most instructive aspect of Silverstone’s essay is that he surveys the scholarly 
literature and concludes that ‘a serious short-coming in democratic peace litera-
ture is the dearth of research on how institutional variation among different types 
of democracies will affect conﬂict decision making and the likelihood of constraints 
on the use of force’. 
Countries for which devolution could mean the difference between peace and 
conﬂict are all countries with internal tension or conﬂict. Countries without inter-
nal inter-group or inter-regional stresses despite considerable heterogeneity could 
also derive substantial beneﬁts from increased devolution. Not only is it likely to 
yield signiﬁcant social, cultural and economic gains, but the world’s experience 
suggests that future problems can be avoided or contained. That devolution offers 
their best chance for peace and prosperity is so obvious that it is extraordinary 
that devolution, along with related checks and balances, is not universally regar-
ded by all role players as the central issue around which to negotiate. This is not 
the place to address each country-speciﬁc complexity, but there are some general 
observations worth making. 
At the time of writing there are reports of a Belgian media hoax to the effect 
that Wallonia has seceded. It’s serious purpose is reported to be to gauge public 
reaction to the prospect. The historical context is that, in response to escalating 
inter-group tension, Belgium was divided into three regions (Brussels, Flanders, 
Wallonia) and three communities (Flemish, French, German) in 1980 and the Fle-
mish and Walloon regions and Flemish and French communities were granted ‘au-
tonomy’, and separate Flemish and Walloon regional governments were establis-
hed. The German community was granted autonomy in 1983 and Brussels gained 
autonomy in 1989. Devolution was successfully employed to promote peace, and 
more devolution, or even secession, may be necessary to keep the peace. Scottish 
and Welsh devolution has been employed in the UK to avoid mounting tensions 
between Britain’s constituent ‘countries’. Curiously, the obvious potential for addres-
sing Northern Irish problems by way of intensive Swiss-style devolution has not 
been appreciated or exploited. High degrees of devolution, at times to very small 
communities of the kind found at times during Swiss history, hold the most pro-
mise for peace and stability in Israel-Palestine, Sri Lanka, Pakistan-Kashmir-India, 
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Myanmar and elsewhere. The potential contribution of devolution is recognised in 
conﬂict-ridden Nigeria, but there does not appear to be sufﬁcient willingness on 
the part of those wanting to enjoy supposed beneﬁts of centralised power to ‘let 
things go’ so to speak. In particular, Nigeria’s role players are not ready to accept 
real economic and ﬁscal federalism of the kind that China has albeit merely de 
facto. Speaking of China, its extreme degree of internal regional diversity is such 
that one must assume the communist regime never gained centralised power of 
the kind popularly assumed, and that it is a matter of time before formal de jure 
devolution becomes inevitable – hopefully before lingering attempts at centralised 
power precipitate conﬂict.
Canada is a well-known example of the conﬂict-reducing capacity of devoluti-
on. Although it has and beneﬁts enormously from ﬁscal federalism and a degree of 
economic policy devolution, the full potential beneﬁts are frustrated by a national 
formula whereby tax revenues are redistributed from wealthier to poorer provinces, 
the effect being to reduce incentives for poorer provinces to adopt high-growth 
policies. The levels of autonomy necessary to keep Quebec happily within Canada 
may not yet have been appreciated. Reverting to Africa, it is, of course, riddled with 
heterogeneous societies as a consequence of the arbitrary way in which colonial 
boundaries were established. Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Senegal and Zimbabwe are 
amongst Africa’s many obvious candidates for devolution, and, in some cases, full 
secession, as the best response to internal conﬂict. Intensive devolution - much 
more than is under consideration - is the obvious response for serious considera-
tion in Iraq. Why full separation of seemingly wholly incompatible regions of Iraq 
is not more commonly suggested is unclear to the present author.
There are some of the countries in which devolution could make a decisive 
contribution to achieving the twin ideals of peace and prosperity. There are many 
others, and what this and other analyses hope for is that they help role consti-
tutional players elevate devolution to the status it deserves as they grapple with 
global and local conﬂict.
Devolution and Prosperity
There has been on-going discourse about ‘ﬁscal federalism’ (devolved taxing power) 
and whether federations tend to be more prosperous. I examined studies in both 
directions - some suggesting that the evidence supports the view that federations 
tend to be more prosperous and/or to have lower tax rates; others suggesting that 
the evidence shows the opposite to be true. The simple explanation for discrepancies 
between irreconcilable conclusions purporting to be based on adequate empirical 
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data properly evaluated is that there is insufﬁcient clarity on which federations can 
reasonably be compared with non-federations (a) where they have enough else in 
common for federalism to be regarded as a decisive variable, (b) where there are 
enough examples for statistical relevance, and (c) where there is insufﬁcient clarity 
on what precisely constitutes federalism.14
‘Fiscal federalism’ literature is generally concerned with whether ﬁscal decen-
tralisation coincides with higher economic growth and other measured beneﬁts. 
Fiscal policy is, of course, only one aspect of economic policy. It enjoys most at-
tention because data on tax and spending at various levels of government is more 
copious and accurate than on other aspects of economic policy, some of which 
may be more important determinants. The idea is that ﬁscal devolution is likely to 
have such beneﬁts as enabling local and regional governments to establish regimes 
that are better suited to their circumstances, and that competition between them 
is likely to lead to better policies, especially through the ‘demonstration effect’, 
which presupposes that people can see what succeeds best under comparable con-
ditions. I did a fair amount of proverbial ‘number crunching’ and considered what 
others have done, some of it more elaborate than appears to me to be justiﬁed by 
the paucity of data. 
There is not much evidence either way. Average growth rates for ﬁve-year 
intervals from 1970 to 2002 in the 25 countries generally called federations was 
3.28 %, and 3.53 % for non-federations with populations exceeding one million, a 
difference of 0.25 %. This suggests a small edge in favour of non-federations. Ho-
wever, if one varies the analysis slightly in legitimate ways, such as the inclusion 
of mini-states, the inclusion of only plural societies, the inclusion with federations 
of countries with high degrees of de facto devolution and so on, the advantage 
increases, vanishes or reverses. The logic of, for instance, omitting mini-states 
(< 1 m population) from the list of non-federations is obviously that only bigger 
countries can feasibly be federations. Or so one might assume, but the problem 
is that small countries like St Kitts and Nevis (39,000), Micronesia (111,000) and 
Comoros (700,000), which all have smaller populations than single cities in bigger 
countries, are included in the list of federations. If China is regarded as devolved 
(whether or not it is called a federation), which its extreme internal diversity cer-
tainly justiﬁes, and the per capita growth rates of the world’s populations living 
under devolved systems is compared with that of people living under centralised 
systems, the evidence for federalism would be overwhelming, given the population 
sizes and high growth rates of China and India. 
14 As explained above, what weight to attach to de facto and de jure devolution and to degrees 
of devolution. 
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The full range of plausible analyses is not presented here. Sufﬁce it to say that 
the data can be analysed legitimately (as opposed to manipulated) in ways that pro-
duce varying, inconclusive and sometimes contradictory results. Unfortunately, the 
most appropriate analysis has not been done, comparing the relative performance 
of countries with more devolution with that of ones with less. As stated previous-
ly, this is a serious lacuna in the ﬁelds of analysis in various disciplines, including 
political science, sociology and economics, and should be done as an important 
contribution, not just to constitution planning, but also as a guide to governments 
on whether to devolve and decentralise powers and functions.
Most of the writers on federalism have the view, though with weak empirical 
support, that federalism and devolution has beneﬁts exceeding costs. 
Intuitively, federations probably perform better (by most measures) than they 
would were they not federations, because they, for the most part, are federations 
to avoid internal conﬂict and accommodate diversity. In other words, they would, 
but for being federations, be more likely than other countries on average to be 
unstable and conﬂict-ridden if they had non-federal systems.
Devolution and Democracy
The ﬁrst formally documented federations were Greek federal unions during the 
fourth century. There were earlier federations in practice going back to pharonic 
Egypt and Samaria, but no formal theory of federalism that survives. Greek fede-
rations were analysed inter alia by classical historian, Hans Beck.15 Two features of 
Greek federalism were democracy and ethnicity. Federalism and democracy were 
essentially two sides of a proverbial coin for practical and philosophical reasons, 
so much so that there was no distinguishing terminology for federal institutions 
because they were synonymous with democracy. Lamentably, that understanding 
of the intensively democratic nature of federalism did not survive as an omnipre-
sent consideration in the creation of modern democracies. 
Early democracy, such as in ancient Greece, was feasible only when power was 
sufﬁciently localised for people to be in charge of their own affairs. Thus „democra-
cy“ connotes essentially such things as people controlling their own lives, limited 
power, and the will of the majority. To the extent that it essentially means these 
characteristics, devolution and referenda are more ‘democratic’“ because:
15 Hans Beck, Polis und Koinon. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Struktur der griechischen 
Bundesstaaten im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997
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1. mathematically more people get what they want/vote for, 
2. power is limited to the extent that it is devolved, and 
3. power is limited to the extent that voters vote on issues (direct democracy).
Understanding why and how devolution is more democratic, and deﬁning the 
essentials of liberal democracy (Appendix 4) so that more democracy means more 
liberty, does not per se tell us how much devolution there should be. These two 
tables show by way of simple arithmetic why devolution is more democratic. They 
show that more people get what they vote for when there is devolution. 
Devolution an Ethnicity
Much has been written about devolution and ethnicity. There is, as far as I can 
tell, not much to be added on the matter. Many or most protagonists of federalism 
have ‘ethnic federation’ in mind. The idea is that, where there are high geographic 
concentrations of ethnic groups, inter-group conﬂict can be avoided by allocating 
sufﬁcient power over conﬂict-provoking issues to each group to minimise their 
resentment of others. Classic conﬂict zones of the world, such as Rwanda, the 
Middle East, Northern Ireland and Iraq, cry out for intensive federal devolution. The 
reasons why devolution reduces the prospect of inter-group conﬂict are apparent 
from the preceding analysis.
Devolution and World Government
National and international federalists tend to emanate from opposing paradigms. 
It is not immediately obvious how ideological adversaries could both espouse fe-
Area 1 (50 people) Area 2 (50 people)
51 vote ‘yes’ 
49 vote ‘no’
51 % majority
Area 1 (50 people) Area 2 (50 people)
 10 vote ‘yes’ 41 vote ‘yes’ 
 40 vote ‘no’ 9 vote ‘no’
 80 % majority 82 % majority
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deralism. The explanation is that fault-lines occur according to whether federalism 
is likely to centralise or devolve power. Paradoxically, federalism is presumed to 
be all about the devolution of power, yet most federations arose by virtue of the 
opposite, the centralisation of previously decentralised power. Whether federalisa-
tion devolves or centralises power depends on whether federalism is the result of 
independent states combining into a federation, like the USA, or whether power is 
passed from the government of a unitary state to federal entities, as with Scottish 
and Welsh devolution. The EU is, or will be, a federation by virtue of centralisation 
and Nigeria by virtue of decentralising power from a single military government. 
Protagonists of world government are for global federation. This paper es-
pouses the view that more freedom is one of the virtues of devolution. However, 
global federalists, like Immanuel Kant, regard federation as necessary because 
there is supposedly too much freedom. According to this view there can ‘be no 
true international law as long as states do not abandon their present condition of 
unlimited freedom and accept a common federal constitution, that is, a govern-
ment which has sufﬁcient power to ensure universal peace and the independence 
of each member state’ (http://www.jef-europe.net/index.php?id=1627). This pro-
foundly pessimistic conception of human nature and international relations is that 
free people and free countries are inherently engaged in the notorious Hobbesian 
‘war of all against all’.
The optimistic liberal Misesian conception is that collaboration more typically 
characterises interaction between free people and countries. The proverbial proof 
of the pudding is in the eating; clearly the vast majority of interactions between 
free people and free countries is peaceful. The view that humans are typically ag-
gressive is as odd as it is self-evidently mistaken. When I encounter it I suggest that 
people conduct ‘research by opening their eyes’! All they need do is look. At any 
given time, the overwhelming majority of personal and international interactions 
are peaceful. Pessimists contend that this is so only because people fear reprisals 
by law enforcement agencies and countries. They point to looting when law and 
order break down. Whatever the reason may be for the phenomenon that indivi-
duals usually interact peacefully, the fact is that so do the governments of most 
countries, most of the time, in the absence of a Kantian world federation.
One of the curiosities of the pro-federal literature is the conspicuous divide 
between protagonists of federation as a means for limiting centralised power and 
federation as a means of increasing it. Both sides share the view that federalism 
promotes peace (see e.g. World Federalist Movement, website, www.wfm.org). 
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Conclusion and Proposals
It seems clear a priori that devolution is conducive to peace, simply because it re-
duces the real or perceived need for resistance to domination. Devolution has ad-
ditional beneﬁts, such as accommodating diversity, the demonstration effect and 
more freedom. Empirical veriﬁcation is difﬁcult in the absence of indices ranking 
countries according to how devolved they are. There should also be an index ran-
king countries according to their propensity for conﬂict. It will then be possible 
to demonstrate the conﬂict-reducing propensity of devolution. Policy makers will 
beneﬁt enormously if they have better information on the costs and beneﬁts of 
devolution.
Appendix 1 – Federations of the World
Appendix 1 provides two popular lists of federations, and shows differences bet-
ween them.
Appendix 2 – Federal Characteristics
and provide a summary of the institutional nature of countries in the lists. What 
is most noteworthy about the lists is that countries with virtually no real world 
devolution are included and ones with extreme devolution and/or diversity are 
excluded.
Appendix 3 – Russian Federation
This Appendix shows the complex nature of the Russian Federation, which was 
much more complex as the USSR. It illustrates the extraordinary lengths to which 
supposedly centralist communists, denying differences between people, were wil-
ling to go to achieve peace.
Appendix 4 – Checks and Balances
This Appendix is a summary of checks and balances against the excesses and ab-
use of power. Some are obviously more important than others, and not everyone 
will agree that all are likely to provide more protection than opportunity for abuse. 
Devolution is one of these checks and balances, and certainly one of the most im-
portant if there is to be peace and stability.
Appendix 5 – Selected Bibliography
These are selected readings. Scholarly literature is omitted because (a) it is readi-
ly accessible to academics and (b) this paper is intended for lay intellectuals and 
policy makers.
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Federations
Forum of Federations16 Wikipedia17
Argentina  Argentina
Australia  Australia 
Austria  Austria
Belgium  Belgium
Bosnia & Herzegovina  Bosnia & Herzegovina
Brazil  Brazil
Canada  Canada
Comoros  Comoros
Ethiopia  Ethiopia
Germany  Germany
India  India
––  Iraq
Malaysia  Malaysia
Mexico  Mexico
Micronesia  Micronesia 
Nigeria  Nigeria
Pakistan  Pakistan
Russia  Russia
St. Kitts and Nevis  St. Kitts and Nevis
South Africa  ––
Spain  Spain
––  Sudan
Switzerland  Switzerland
United Arab Emirates  United Arab Emirates
USA  USA
Venezuela Venezuela
Appendix 1 
Federation lists
16 http://www.forumfed.org/federalism/cntrylist.asp?lang=en (2006)
17 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/, (2006)
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Appendix 2 
Federation characteristics
Sources: Ann L. Grifﬁths (Editor) & Karl Nerenberg (Coordinator), Handbook of Federal Countries, 
2005. 
Author’s research
 Federation Federal units
1 Argentina 23 provinces; 1 district
2 Australia 6 states; 1 district/territory; 1 major territory;  
  minor territories
3 Austria 9 states (länder)
4 Belgium 3 communities (linguistic); 3 regions
5 Bosnia & Herzegovina 2 entities; 1 district;  
  1 internationally supervised district
6 Brazil 26 states; 1 district
7 Canada 10 provinces; 3 territories
8 Comoros 3 islands
9 Ethiopia 9 regions; 2 chartered cities
10 Germany 16 states (länder)
11 India 28 states; 7 territories
12 Iraq 18 governorates, 1 autonomous region; 
13 Malaysia 13 states; 3 territories
14 Mexico 31 states; 1 district
15 FS Micronesia 4 states
16 Nigeria 36 states; 1 territory
17 Pakistan 4 provinces; 4 territories
18 Russia 48 oblasts; 21 republics; 10 okrugs; 7 krays;  
  2 autonomous cities
19 Saint Kitts and Nevis 2 islands; 14 parishes
20 South Africa 9 provinces
21 Sudan 26 states
22 Switzerland 26 cantons; 2890 autonomous communities
23 United Arab Emirates 7 emirates
24 United States 50 states; 1 district; 1 territory; unincorporated  
  territories
25 Venezuela 23 states; 1 dependency; 1 district
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Appendix 3 
Democratic Checks And Balances
(See 9 for Devolution)
This is a list, with minimal commentary, and in no speciﬁc order, of recognised 
and proven constitutional and democratic mechanisms (checks and balances). 
See the Endnote for an explanation of why constitutions should have checks and 
balances.
The reason for these checks and balances not to be ordered is important. Which 
will be more or less important varies enormously according to context. Devolution, 
for instance, may be of the highest priority for an internally divided country. An 
independent judiciary might be of greatest importance for a country with a history 
of political interference and patronage.
The ideal combination of checks and balances may be thought of as those an 
informed individual would want if his/her worst enemy were in power. The point 
is illustrated by the application of the you-divide-I-choose wisdom of Solomon 
to constitutionalism. Political rivals could draw lots to decide who is to write the 
constitution. They do so subject to a single condition: the other side will govern.
21 republics (respubliki) – nominally autonomous with own constitutions, 
presidents and parliaments; each is an ethnic homeland.
48 provinces (oblasts) – administrative units with federally appointed gover-
nors and elected legislatures.
7 territories (krays or krais) – similar to oblasts; less autonomous.
1 autonomous province (avtonomnaya oblast) – a Jewish autonomous  
province.
9 autonomous districts (okrugs) – more autonomous than oblasts; less so 
than republics; also usually ethnic homelands.
2 federal cities (federalnyye gorods) – major cities with regional status and 
autonomy.
Appendix 3 
Composition of the Russian Federation
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1. Direct Democracy (Referenda)
1.1 Optional (by government decree)
1.2 Initiatives (by citizens petitions)
1.3 Obligatory (required by constitution eg amendment of entrenched clauses 
or speciﬁed laws)
1.4 Recall
2. Elections
2.1 President/Prime Minister
2.2 Politicians
2.3 Speciﬁed government ofﬁcials
2.4 Limited term of ofﬁce
3. Voting Systems
3.1 Universal and equal franchise
3.2 Secret ballot
3.3 Multiple choice –
3.3.1 List
3.3.2 Transferable vote
3.3.3 Cumulative vote
3.3.4 Alternate elections
4. Proportional Representation
4.1 At all levels
4.2 In prescribed bodies (eg Cabinet, school boards)
5. Bicameralism
5.1 National and geographic houses
5.2 Equal powers (for initiation, adoption, veto)
6. Separation Of Powers
6.1 Legislative
6.2 Administrative
6.3 Judicial
6.4 Autonomous agencies
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6.4.1 Central bank (for stable money)
6.4.2 Ombud(sman)/Public Protector
6.4.3 Human Rights Commission
6.4.4 Auditor-General
6.4.5 Law Commission (including screening of laws)
6.5 Delineation of functions (the maintenance of clear boundaries between 
the functions of departments and agencies, vertically and horizontally).
7. Independent Judiciary
7.1 Vertically:
7.1.1 Small Claims/People’s Court
7.1.2 Magistrates/Lower Courts
7.1.3 Common Law/Customary Courts
7.1.4 High/Upper Courts
7.1.5 Constitutional Court
7.1.6 Supreme/Appeal Court
7.2 Horizontally:
7.2.1 Local/Municipal/Magisterial Districts
7.2.2 Regional High/Upper Courts
8. Bill Of Rights
8.1 Civil liberties –
8.1.1 Association/disassociation
8.1.2  Religion/values/lifestyle
8.1.3  Speech/press/broadcasting
8.1.4  Assembly/protest
8.1.5  Due process/procedural fairness (administrative and judicial):
8.1.5.1 Notice of charge
8.1.5.2 Right to be present 
8.1.5.3 No detention without trial
8.1.5.4 Habeas corpus/bail
8.1.5.5  Right to be heard/audi alteram partem
8.1.5.6 Right to be silent
8.1.5.7 Right to cross-examine
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8.1.5.8 Access to information
8.1.5.9 Access to justice/remedies (accessible and affordable/free 
courts)
8.1.5.10 Right to trial by jury of peers
8.1.5.11 Expedition („justice delayed is justice denied“)
8.1.5.12 Presumption of innocence
8.1.5.13 Right to assistance/representation/counsel
8.1.5.14 Impartiality
8.1.5.15 Right of review/appeal (at least from 1st instance; to 
independent court)
  8.1.5.15.1 Right of review (on procedure)
  8.1.5.15.2 Right of appeal (on merits)
8.1.6 Movement/residence
8.1.7 Informed adult consent
8.1.8 Rule of law, not men (see below)
8.1.9 Right to privacy
8.1.10 Right to security
8.1.10.1 of person 
8.1.10.2 of property
8.1.10.3 of conscience
8.2 Economic freedoms –
8.2.1 Property rights
8.2.1.1 Owner‘s/proprietor‘s discretion (condition/right of admis-
sion)
8.2.1.2 No expropriation/conﬁscation (except possibly for place/
route-bound infrastructure)
8.2.2 Freedom of contract
8.2.3 Freedom of enterprise/entry/competition
8.2.4 Right to work (freedom of employment/self-employment)
8.2.5 Balanced budget
8.3 Social rights (2nd/3rd/4th generation rights) -
 Note: So-called „1st generation“ rights protect the individual against 
abuse of power by the state or the majority. Social, or „2nd/3rd/4th 
34 Devolution as a Guarantor of Peace
generation“ rights are beneﬁts that are considered to be desirable. They 
can be in 1st generation form, so that measures, such as unreasonably 
burdensome licensing laws, which inhibit the attainment of those rights 
can be challenged. Or they can be in the form of legal obligation on 
the state (and therefore on fellow citizens) to „deliver“ the rights. One 
is a negative obligation to desist (the state must not harm its citizens); 
the other a positive obligation to act (the state must supply goods and 
services).
 Since 2nd generation rights are dependent on availability of resources, 
they cannot be absolutely justiciable – 1st generation rights are directly 
justiciable because they require of the state no more than cost-free 
inaction. 2nd generation rights in the 1st generation form would mean 
that (a) no law or action may deprive citizens of the right to pursue the 
satisfaction of those rights relatively freely, and/or that (b) the state is 
obliged to create an enabling environment.
 Second generation rights are e.g. housing, education, employment, health 
care, and pensions. Third generation rights are e.g. a clean and safe en-
vironment. Fourth generation rights are e.g. the right to happiness and 
feelings of security (absence of fear etc).
8.4 Political rights (Democratic processes described above and below)
9. Devolution Of Power
9.1 Regional level
9.2 District level
9.3 Local level
9.4 Community level
 (Speciﬁed in the constitution and entrenched in the „subsidiarity“ principle that 
only powers that cannot be realistically exercised at lower levels are exercised 
at higher levels)
10. Democratic Culture/Values
10.1 Civil society
10.2 System above party
11. Sunset Clauses
 (For transitional powers e.g. afﬁrmative action. Also the idea that all legisla-
tion should specify its own „shelf-life“, or be subject to a default shelf-life, to 
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insure that measures do not outlast their usefulness or purpose, and that their 
efﬁcacy is monitored and reviewed.)
12. Secession
 (By adequate majority in referendum)
13. Ombudsman
14. Subsidiary Constitutions
 (For regions and even districts/communities)
15. Head of State
15.1 Titular President (with executive Prime Minister)
15.2 Executive President
15.3 Head of State powers:
15.3.1 Formalistic function
15.3.2 Limited powers/suspensive veto/reference to Constitutional / High 
Court
15.2 Appointment:
15.4.1 Party leader
15.4.2 Electoral college
15.4.3 Election/plebiscite
15.4.2 Rotational (alternating through cabinet and/or elected)
16. Entrenched Clauses
 (Minimum vote/referendum)
16.1 Constitutional amendment
16.2 Speciﬁed law /rights (e.g. cultural/group rights)
17. Minority Victimisation
 (Judicial test of „minority“ and „victimisation“)
17.1 Class/minority actions
17.2 Public interest actions
18. Government Equivalence
 (Government not to exempt itself from laws/regulations, except as speciﬁed in 
the constitution, for e.g. the right to tax)
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19. Term Limits
 (Maxima for the numbers of terms/years speciﬁed politicians/ofﬁcials might 
serve, or be re-elected. Negative considerations are [a] that term limits are a 
restraint on the right of voters to choose whomever they wish, and [b] that 
if some ofﬁcials, such as judges and magistrates, do not have tenure, their 
independence is compromised.)
20. Rule of Law
 Many elements of the rule of law are speciﬁed above. A constitution can, or 
perhaps should, be explicit about the rule of law being basic law. In other 
words, all laws and practices will have to be consistent with the rule of law. 
The rule of law is essentially the absence of the „rule of man“. The rule of law 
is not the same as or a synonym for freedom. The term is commonly used as if 
it is. Whilst it per se is no guarantee of freedom, it does make freedom much 
more likely, because the absence of an ability for those with power to wield it 
arbitrarily or capriciously minimises real or suspected abuse of power, corrup-
tion, patronage, nepotism or discrimination. Accordingly, the elements of the 
rule of law not mentioned above in relevant contexts are:
20.1 Certainty – People’s rights and obligations being clearly and unambi-
guously stated in laws made in accordance with the Constitution, which 
itself must be consistent with the rule of law. 
20.2 Non-retroactivity – Retroactive law is law to which people could not 
have known they were subject, which means they were not being ruled 
by law, but by subsequent arbitrary discretion.
20.3 Objective criteria – Where legitimate powers are delegated in accordance 
with the separation of powers, they must be accompanied by objective 
criteria according to which the powers must or may be exercised. To be 
objective, the powers must also be accompanied by the objectives for 
which the power is delegated, otherwise the manner of implementation 
would be „the rule of man“.
20.4 General application – Laws must apply equally to all, and must not 
discriminate unfairly.
20.5 Accessibility – The right of citizens to know in advance what the law is, 
and to ﬁnd out with relative ease. A popular modern view is that laws 
should also be drafted in “plain” language.
Endnote – why checks and balances? 
Constitutional checks and balances are generally presumed to be a virtuous end in 
themselves. They provide per se desirable protections against the abuse of power. 
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They tend to be resented by people in power because they inhibit their ability to 
„get on with“ the business of government. Governments of the day, and their con-
stituents tend to want laws and administrative actions to „have teeth“. The demands 
of due process appear to be needlessly costly and cumbersome. 
However, what is seldom appreciated is the extent to which constitutional 
checks and balances are practical and expedient, even for those in power. Firstly, 
they protect those in power from unrealistic expectations and demands of their 
constituencies. Secondly, they have been shown by the world’s experience to be 
among the most decisive factors in generating peace and prosperity, and thus the 
political popularity of those in power. There is now unambiguous statistical evi-
dence that constitutional democracies with more, rather than fewer, constraints 
on the use and abuse of power outperform all other systems of government. The 
evidence is that the more there are of the checks and balances mentioned above, 
the better for all concerned.
Thirdly, those in power at any given time might, as individuals, themselves need 
the protection of such checks and balances. They might, for instance be falsely ac-
cused of anything from sedition to a petty offence. Fourthly, should those in power, 
or some of them, lose power (for whatever reason), the presence of an excellent 
constitution will ensure them the best prospect of regaining it.
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